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1I. Introduction
According to standard wisdom of economics competition promotes economic
efficiency. In line with this general view intensified competition in product markets
could be expected to promote employment. However, with labor market imperfections
the effects of intensified product market competition on unemployment are far from
self-evident.
In the present study we explore the impact of intensified product market
competition in the presence of profit sharing on price setting, wage formation and
equilibrium unemployment.  We show the following results. The optimal profit share,
to which firms commit themselves prior to the wage negotiation, is smaller than the
bargaining power of the trade union unlike existing results in the current literature and
more consistent with empirics. Intensified product market competition decreases
optimal profit sharing, but ít will have a positive effect on the negotiated base wage.
Intensified product market competition increases the negotiated base wage, because the
wage-enhancing effect of the reduced profit shares dominates relative to the wage-
moderating effect associated with higher wage elasticity of labor demand. For that
reason intensified product market competition does not necessarily reduce equilibrium
unemployment, because it induces a higher base wage mark-up through a lower optimal
profit share.
In light of the arguments developed above, reduced distortions in the product
market do not necessarily improve the performance of the labor market, which suffers
from a primary distortion with its roots in the bargaining power of the trade union.
However, when firms commit to optimal profit sharing, intensified product market
competition will indeed decrease equilibrium unemployment in the case of a monopoly
trade union, while it has no effect on equilibrium unemployment when the trade union
has no bargaining power. Finally, in the absence of profit sharing, intensified product
market competition will always decrease the equilibrium unemployment by
unambiguously decreasing the distortionary wage mark-up in the labor market. Thus,
2the performance-based remuneration system in the form of profit sharing seems to play
an important role for the relationship between imperfections in product and labor
markets. Overall, we characterize in detailed simulations those circumstances where
intensified product market competition, in the presence of profit sharing, hurts
employment.
Some employment consequences of intensified competition and deregulation in
product markets have been analyzed in the recent literature. Next we briefly
characterize these. Nickell (1999) has surveyed how market power in the product
markets impacts on the performance of the labor market by reviewing collective
bargaining models and efficiency wage models for the wage determination. There is
some evidence that sharing of monopoly rents leads to higher wages in the presence
market power in the product markets, but it is not clear whether this is essentially a
union effect or applies equally well in the non-union sector. Gersbach (2000)
summarizes three mechanisms, through which reductions in product market
imperfections might enhance employment and concludes that product market reforms
in Europe could imply employment gains. These mechanisms are based on lower mark-
ups, higher total productivity and expanded sets of product varieties (see also Gersbach
and Schniewind 2001).
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Spector (2004) have developed a
monopolistic competition model with collective wage bargaining, but not profit
sharing, to study the effects of product market competition under imperfectly
competitive labor markets and argued that higher product market competition will
increase employment. Ebell and Haefke (2003) have studied the relationship between
product market structure and labor market outcomes by focusing on Mortensen-
Pissarides-type search and matching frictions and monopolistic competition in the
product markets when there is individual wage bargaining. Their qualitative findings
are roughly similar to those of Blachard and Giavazzi (2003) and Spector (2004).
Amable and Gatti (2004) have developed a different type of framework. They use a
model of monopolistic competition with an endogenous determination of worker flows
in and out of employment where wages are determined, not by bargaining, but by an
efficiency wage mechanism and they show that higher product market competition may
generate employment losses rather than gains.
3Bayomi, Laxton and Presenti (2004) have applied a general equilibrium model of
the global economy to examine the benefits from greater competition in product and
labor markets on output, consumption and the stability of the economy. They estimate
the macroeconomic benefits and international spillovers of intensified competition in
the product and labor markets and conclude that greater competition significantly
stimulates macroeconomic performance and that it may improve macroeconomic
management by increasing the responsiveness of wages and prices to market
conditions. However, they do not model labor markets explicitly. Abowd and Lemieux
(1993) has studied how product market conditions affect wages through their effects on
the financial strength of the firm by using data from collective agreements in Canada
and they show that higher foreign competition reduces wages. Nickell, Vainiomaki and
Wadhwani (1994) and Konings and Walsh (2000) have also empirically explored some
aspects of the employment effects of product market imperfections with imperfectly
competitive labor markets. Using British firm level data Nickell, Vainiomaki and
Wadhwani (1994) argue that product market power raises wages, while Konings and
Walsh (2000) indicate that the impact of stronger product market competition on
employment loss is lower in unionised firms compared with non-unionised firms.
It seems timely to investigate the effects of stronger product market competition
on employment in light of the steady trend towards more intense product market
competition in the OECD countries, and, in particular, in Europe. Conway, Janod and
Nicoletti (2005) have in great detail delineated recent trends of product market
deregulation, and intensified competition, in OECD countries by using indicators of
product market regulation. Clearly, regulatory impediments to product market
competition have declined significantly in all OECD countries in recent years. For the
group of EU member countries product market regulation is typically more
homogenous, at least when evaluated year 2003, than in the rest of OECD.1
Furthermore, European competition policy in combination with improvements in the
1 Countries that were estimated to be relatively liberal in 1998 – the United Kingdom, the Unites
States, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Ireland and Denmark – have reported relatively small
degrees of relaxation in product market regulation. Countries estimated to be in the middle in
terms of regulation indicator in 1998 are Iceland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Germany,
Austria, Japan, Belgium, Finland, Switzerland and Portugal. All of these countries have made
progress in reducing the extent of state control, while reductions in barriers to entrepreneurship
have been more disparate across these countries.
4implementation of competition law has promoted product market competition by
making it more difficult for firms to abuse dominant market positions.
The entire literature mentioned above, no matter whether theoretically oriented or
empirically oriented, has abstracted from profit sharing as part of the compensation
scheme in the labor market. However, profit sharing is an empirically important
phenomenon in many OECD countries and our model predicts that it plays a significant
role for the theoretical relationship between the imperfections in product markets and
equilibrium unemployment with imperfectly competitive labor markets. The OECD
Employment Outlook (1995) reports general cross-country evidence on the incidence of
profit sharing in OECD countries. Pendleton et. al. (2001) presents more recent and
detailed data on the significant proportion of workplaces with financial employee
participation, in particular in the form of profit sharing schemes, in 14 EU countries.
This information is illustrated in Figure 1. For example, among EU-countries in
1999/2000 a double-digit percentage of the workplaces apply profit sharing in Austria,
Finland, France, Germany Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United
Kingdom. In some countries with particularly extensive profit sharing systems, like
France, public policy explicitly encourages profit sharing. For further evidence
regarding the incidence of profit sharing we refer to, for example, the DICE database
collected by CESifo (http://www.CESifo.de), Wadhwani and Wall (1990), Cahuc and
Dormont (1997) as well as Conyon and Freeman (2001).
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Figure 1: Workplaces with Profit Sharing in Percent, 1999/2000
Source: Pendleton, A., Poutsma, E., van Ommeren, J., Brewster, C., Employee Profit Sharing in the
European Union, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2001.
5Our study proceeds as follows. Section II presents the basic structure of the
model as well as the time sequence of decisions with product and labor market
imperfections. Price setting and labor demand by firms are studied in section III.  In
section IV we analyze the wage determination using the Nash bargaining approach
subject to price setting and labor demand. Section V explores the determination of
optimal profit sharing, to which firms commit themselves prior to the wage
determination. In section VI we characterize the determinants of the equilibrium
unemployment with a particular emphasis on how it depends on the intensity of product
market competition. Finally, in section VII we present concluding comments.
II. Basic Framework
We focus on a deterministic model under product and labor market imperfections
with the following time sequence of decisions. In the long run, at stage 1, the firms
commit themselves to a profit-sharing arrangement, which specifies to what extent the
wage contracts are performance-related. The profit share,? , determines what fraction
of the firms’ profits will be transferred to employed workers. The profit sharing
decision is made in anticipation of its effects on the negotiated base wage as well as on
price setting and labor demand. At stage 2 firms and labor unions bargain with respect
to the base wage and this negotiation takes place under conditions where the firms are
committed to the profit sharing contracts. The wage negotiations take place in
anticipation of the consequences for labor demand and price setting. Finally, at stage 3
firms make employment decisions and set product prices in the monopolistic
competition by taking the profit sharing and the negotiated base wage as given.
We summarize the time sequence of decisions in Figure 1. In the subsequent
sections we derive the decisions taking place at different stages by using backward
induction.
This timing structure captures the idea that the profit sharing decisions take place
within the framework of an institutional environment where the profit-sharing schemes
6have to be independent of the wage agreements. This timing structure seems to be a
reasonably accurate description of how profit-sharing arrangements operate in many
countries2 (see, for example, Cahuc and Dormont (1997) and Pendleton et. al. (2001)).
Of course, the relative timing between the negotiated wage setting and the profit-
sharing decision could also be reversed so as to capture the case where the negotiated
base wage is a long-term contract relative to the firms’ design of the performance-
related compensation component.3
         Stage 1         Stage 2         Stage 3
             time
      profit sharing wage labor demand
         bargaining price setting
Figure 2: Time sequence of decisions
We postulate (for each firm i ) a Cobb-Douglas production function according to
?
?LLR ii ?)( , i = 1,… ,n                                                                                 (1)
where iL  denotes the amount of labor (i.e. employment), and a  is a parameter
satisfying 0 < a < 1. Thus, (1) is a well-defined production function exhibiting
decreasing returns to scale with respect to employment.
III. Price Setting and Labor Demand
2 For example, in France, where the reported proportion of workplaces with profit sharing exceeds
50 %, firms can qualify for tax exemptions if they apply profit sharing schemes, which stipulate
bonuses which are independent of the negotiated base wage.
3 Koskela and Stenbacka (2005) have explored the impact of different time sequences between
profit sharing decisions and base wage negotiations in a different model, which did not investigate
the role of imperfections in the product market.
7In this paper the product market is modeled to operate with monopolistic
competition in line with Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The firms face consumers endowed
with the CES - utility function
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where 1?s  denotes the elasticity of substitution between products and where n  is the
number of products (and firms). We assume that this elasticity of substitution measures
the degree of product market competition.4 A higher elasticity of substitution means a
higher degree of product market competition. In particular, the limiting case of perfect
competition is associated with the elasticity of substitution s  approaching infinity.
Firm i  decides on price and employment so as to maximize the following profit
function
? ? ?iiiiiiii
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At this stage the firm takes the negotiated wage rate iw  and the profit share i?  as given.
From the underlying utility function, given by (2), the demand in the product market
can be seen to be of the form
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where ip  is the price of good i ,
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11  is the index of the aggregate price
level, M  is the aggregate nominal income. Thus, M/P denotes the real income.5
4 Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) have analyzed the case, where s  is determined through a process
of free entry so that s  is endogenous in the long run. The utility function (2) has the special
feature that an increase in the number of products does not increase utility directly (for more
discussion in this respect, see Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), p. 882). In our framework the
number of firms is assumed to be fixed.
5 A formal standard proof is available upon request.
8By imposing market-clearing in the product markets, ii RD ? , we can re-
express the profit function (3) for the purpose of price setting according to
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where PM ,  and iw  are taken as given. The necessary first-order condition associated
with (5) can be expressed as
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By imposing the symmetry condition Ppi ?  for all i, (6) can be simplified according
to the following price-setting rule
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where the mark-up factor, )1/()( ?? sss? , associated with the pricing equilibrium,
depends negatively on the elasticity of substitution between products, i.e. on the higher
product market competition.
From (7) we can derive the following qualitative properties to the price setting:
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These findings are summarized in
Proposition 1 Higher wage rates and higher income will raise the equilibrium price in
the product market, while higher product market competition will decrease the price.
We next study labor demand with a particular emphasis on the effects of
product market competition. The necessary first-order condition determining labor
demand can be written as
90???
?
?
iLii
i
wRp
L i
?
,              (9)
implying that the labor demand can be expressed as
?? ?
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iii wpL  .            (10)
It should be emphasized that (10) is an implicit formulation of the labor demand,
because ip is endogenous and determined by (7). For the subsequent analysis we focus
on a symmetric configuration with a representative firm and leave out the firm-specific
index.
The wage elasticity of labor demand, which turns out to be important later on,
can be written as (see Appendix A)
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From (11) we can conclude that the wage elasticity of labor demand is determined by
two parameters: the concavity of the production function (? ) and the degree of
competition in the product markets ( s ). We observe that intensified product market
competition, measured by higher elasticity of substitution between the products,
increases the wage elasticity of labor demand. Namely, formally we find that
0
))1(( 2
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Intuitively, intensified product market competition makes it harder for the firms to
survive with higher wages and thus increased competition makes the firms’
employment decisions more sensitive to changes in the wage rate. It is important to
emphasize that there is no direct effect of profit sharing on the wage elasticity. This is
because profit sharing operates like a non-distortionary profit tax and, therefore, does
not affect labor demand (see (3)).
We can summarize this in
10
Proposition 2 Intensified product market competition will increase the wage elasticity
of labor demand.
IV.  Wage Negotiation
We now turn to analyze the stage where the base wage is determined under
circumstances where the profit share ?  is given. We apply the Nash bargaining
solution within the context of the ‘right-to-manage’ approach according to which
employment is unilaterally determined by the firms. The wage bargaining takes place in
anticipation of the optimal price and employment decisions by the firms.
We write the linear utilitarian objective function of the trade union as
? ? bLNLwLwU )()()(ˆ **** ???? ?? ,           (13)
where the first term captures the rent to the employed and the second term that to the
unemployed union members and where *?  denotes the indirect profit function. The
parameter b  captures the exogenous outside option. We denote the relative bargaining
power of the union by ? , and that of the firm by )1( ?? , and assume that the threat
points of the trade union and the firm are described by NbU o ?  and 0?o? ,
respectively. Applying the Nash bargaining solution the negotiating parties decide on
the base wage w  in order to solve
? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ???? 1*
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w
s.t. 0?? Lp ??                                       (14)
 where ? ?*** )()(ˆ ?? LbwLUUU o ?????  is the bargaining surplus to the union.
As shown in detail in Appendix B the indirect profit can be expressed as
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The Nash bargaining solution satisfies the following first-order condition
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As shown in Appendix C, we can explicitly solve the first-order condition (16) to find
the following Nash bargaining solution
? ?
? ? bw
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According to (17) the negotiated wage rate is proportional to the outside option
( b ) and the proportionality factor delineates the mark-up incorporated in the negotiated
wage. As usual, this wage mark-up depends positively on the relative bargaining power
of the trade union ( ? ). Moreover, we can directly observe that an increased profit
share (? ) will have a wage-moderating effect. Thus, under the specified time sequence
of decisions, profit sharing serves as a strategic commitment device, which will affect
the distribution of the rents achieved through wage bargaining.
In the absence of profit sharing, differentiating (17) with respect to the index s  of
product market competition gives
? ? 0)1()1)(1(
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where ? ? .0)1( 2 ???? ? ???? ss Hence, in the absence of profit sharing intensified
product market competition will moderate wage formation, ceteris paribus. This lies in
conformity with empirical evidence, according to which higher product market
competition will moderate wage formation when profit sharing is not taken into
account. Nickell (1999) presents a survey of this literature, which includes, for
example, Abowd and Lemieux (1993) (Canadian data), Nickell, Vainiomäki and
Wadhwani (1994) (British manufacturing data) and Neven, Röller and Zhang (1999)
(data from eight European airline companies) to analyze links between product market
competition and union power.
         Finally, in the presence of profit sharing straightforward calculations demonstrate
that
12
? ?
? ? b
wN
2
2
)1()1())1((
)1(
??????
????
? ?????
???
?
? .             (19)
Consequently, we can conclude that the difference between the profit share and the
bargaining power of the trade union is a crucial determinant of how an increase in the
wage elasticity of labor demand (? ) impacts on the negotiated wage rate in the
presence of profit sharing. We summarise our characterization of the negotiated base
wage in
Proposition 3 The negotiated base wage is proportional to the outside option. The
wage mark-up is decreasing as a function of the profit share. Also in the presence of
profit sharing it is decreasing as a function of the wage elasticity of labor demand if
and only if the profit share is smaller than the relative bargaining power of the trade
union, while in the absence of profit sharing the wage mark-up is a decreasing function
of the wage elasticity of labor demand.
In terms of empirics, it seems reasonable that the relative bargaining power of
the trade union would exceed the adopted profit shares meaning that there would be a
negative relationship between the wage elasticity of labor demand and the negotiated
base wage. In the next section we show that this also holds true in our theoretical
framework when firms decide on profit sharing in an optimal way. Furthermore, from
(17) we can conclude that the intensity of competition in the product market has no
direct effect on the negotiated base wage. However, the intensity of competition in the
product market affects the negotiated wage through two indirect mechanisms, namely
via the profit share and the wage elasticity of labor demand. The wage elasticity of
labor demand will increase as a result of intensified product market competition (see
(12)). We evaluate the relationship between optimal profit sharing and product market
competition in section V. This will make it possible to offer a complete characterization
of the relationship between the intensity of product market competition and the
negotiated base wage in the presence of optimal profit sharing.
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The Nash bargaining solution (17) implies a number of interesting special cases.
If all the bargaining power lies with the union ( 1?? ), the Nash bargaining solution is
simplified to the monopoly union solution6
bwM
??
?
? ??
?
? 11
  . (20a)
If, on the other hand, all the bargaining power is concentrated in the hands of the firm,
(17) will reduce to
bwM
)1(0 ???
?
? ??
?
?
 ,          (20b)
Both the special cases (20a) and (20b) highlight the wage-moderating effects of profit
sharing. In particular, with no bargaining power for the trade union, (20b) shows that
introduction of profit sharing makes it possible to reduce the base wage of the workers
even below the exogenous outside option.
V. Determination of Committed Profit Sharing
We now proceed to analyze the firm’s optimal commitment to the compensation
structure in the form of a profit share. As we have demonstrated in the previous section,
the profit share will subsequently impact on the negotiated base wage and thereby on
employment. The firm decides on the profit share in order to solve the following
optimization problem7
? ?
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?
???? *
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*
)(
)()1()1(max LwLp N
?
???
?
?
s.t. 0???? pLw ??  .        (21)
6 This special case has been earlier presented by Jackman (1988) in the case of imperfect product
market competition.
7 A number of contributions to the literature on wage bargaining, for example, Anderson and
Devereux (1989), Pohjola (1987), Holmlund (1991) and  Jerger and Michaelis (1999) have
analyzed profit sharing within a framework where the union-firm negotiations include profit
shares in addition to base wages. All of these studies abstract from product market imperfections,
which is the novel and central feature in our analysis.
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 By substituting Nw w)1(
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reformulated according to
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we can explicitly solve for the optimal profit share. Executing this operation we find
that the optimal profit share is given by
??
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   .                                                                 (24)
    According to (24) the optimal profit share increases with the relative bargaining
power of the trade union, because the induced base wage moderation stimulates the
firm’s use of profit sharing. Further, we can infer that the optimal profit share is always
below the bargaining power of the trade union, i.e. ?? ?* .8  Finally, from (24) we can
conclude that intensified product market competition reduces the firm’s incentives to
use profit sharing. We summarize our findings in
8 Holmlund (1991) analyzed profit sharing in the absence of product market imperfections and
within a framework of simultaneous negotiations with respect to both the base wage and the profit
share. In such a framework he showed that the negotiated profit share is equal to the relative
bargaining power of the trade union. Clearly, when firms commit themselves to profit sharing the
optimal profit share (24) is below the trade union’s bargaining power. Furthermore, the difference
between the trade union’s bargaining power and (24) is larger the more competitive are the
product markets. This is a new finding as well. Sorensen (1992) used a unionized duopoly model
to ask when it is optimal for firms to introduce profit sharing as part of the compensation system.
He argued that a profit-sharing system is established by both firms in a Nash equilibrium if both
trade unions have limited bargaining power.
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Proposition 4 The optimal profit share is increasing as a function of the relative
bargaining power of the trade union, but it is always below this bargaining power.
Further, intensified competition in the product market decreases the optimal profit
share.
From (24) we can extract two interesting special cases. First, in the absence of
product market imperfections, i.e. when ??s , the optimal profit share approaches
zero. In other words, with perfect competition in the product market the firm would
have no incentives to introduce profit sharing. This is because with perfect competition
in the product market the wage elasticity of labor demand is very high and thereby
wage moderation can be achieved without introducing the profit sharing. Second, in the
absence of labor market imperfections, i.e. when 0?? , the optimal profit share is
zero. Thus, we can formulate the following
Corollary 1 In the absence of product market imperfections ( ??s ) or labor
market imperfections ( 0?? ) the optimal profit share is zero.
Now, after having characterized the optimal profit share we can analyze the
impact of intensified product market competition on the negotiated base wage.
Differentiating (17) with respect to the index s  of product market competition gives
? ? ? ?
? ? bs
w sss
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                                                                   (25)
According to (25), intensified product market competition will have a twofold effect on
the negotiated wage: (1) a positive effect on the wage elasticity of labor demand
( 0?s? ) and (2) a negative effect on the optimal profit share ( 0?s? ). Using the fact
? ? 0)1( 2
2
?
??
??
??
?????
sss
 we can re-express (25) as follows
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Hence we report the following new finding
Proposition 5 When the firms commit themselves to an optimal system of profit
sharing, intensified product market competition will increase the negotiated wage rate.
The interpretation of Proposition 5 goes as follows. Intensified product market
competition will both (i) increase wage elasticity of labor demand and (ii) decrease the
firm’s optimal profit share. The higher wage elasticity moderates the negotiated base
wage, while the lower profit share will have an offsetting effect and, in fact, the latter
effect will dominate. To the best of our knowledge this question about the relationship
between the intensity of product market competition and the base wage formation in the
presence of profit sharing has not been studied empirically.
 VI. Equilibrium Unemployment, Product Market Competition and
Profit Sharing
So far we have studied the formation of the negotiated base wage and the
optimal profit share with a particular emphasis on how intensified product market
competition affects these. We now integrate these elements in order to explore the
consequences of imperfections in the labor and product markets for total employment
in a general equilibrium context, where the labor force is mobile across industries.
According to (17) for each industry the negotiated wage has the form
bw i
N
i ??  ,            (27)
where the mark-up factor
???????
?????
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?????
????iA is, in principle,
industry-specific. We assume that all industries are identical so that so that the mark-
ups are AAi ? . In a general equilibrium context with labor mobility across identical
17
industries, which all apply profit sharing, the outside option b is now, in line with, for
example, Jerger and Michaelis (1999), interpreted to be
uB
L
Ewub N ??
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??? *
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)1( ?? ,           (28)
where u  denotes the unemployment rate, B  denotes the unemployment benefit, ?  is
the profit share and Nw is the negotiated wage rate in all the identical industries.9 Thus,
the economy-wide base wage, the rate of profit sharing and the unemployment benefit
constitute those components of the outside option, which are relevant for the wage
negotiation.
From (28) we can immediately infer that intensified product market competition
will impact on the outside option available to the trade union in a general equilibrium
context through several mechanisms. In the subsequent analysis we will be able to
compare these various opposite effects and thereby to evaluate the overall employment
consequences of intensified product market competition.
In line with the literature we restrict ourselves to a constant benefit-replacement
ratio NwBq /? . Combining (27) and (28) the equilibrium unemployment, Nu , can be
solved from the equation
?
?
?
?
?
?
???
?????
???? qu
Lw
u NN
N )1()1(
)1()1())1((
)1()1(1 *
**
*
??
??????
????? ,
where we can calculate that
?
???? )1(*
*
** ?
?
LwN
 . Substituting (24) into this equation
and solving with respect to the equilibrium unemployment we find that
q
Au N
???
???
?
?
??
?
??
*
*
)1(1
1)1(1
. (29)
According to (29) the equilibrium unemployment Nu depends positively both on
the benefit-replacement ratio ( q ) and on the wage mark-up in the labor market
9      For a standard justification of this interpretation, see Layard et. al (1991) and  Nickell and
Layard (1999).
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( 1?A ).10 This mark-up is a positive function of the relative bargaining power of the
trade union ( ? ) and a negative function on the profit share (? ).
Differentiating (29) with respect to the relative bargaining power of the trade
union, ? , gives
0
)1(1
))1(1()1()1(
2
*
*
2
*
?
??
?
??
? ??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
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?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
? qA
A
q
Au N   , (30)
where 0* ??? and 0??A . Thus, equilibrium unemployment is always an increasing
function of the relative bargaining power of the trade union, because the bargaining
power has positive effects on both the profit share and on the wage mark-up in labor
market.
Differentiating (29) with respect to s , which captures the index of product
market competition, shows that
2
*
*
2
*
)1(1
))1(1()1()1(
??
?
??
? ??
??
?
??
? ??????
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
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?
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A
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s
u
s
sN
 . (31)
Hence, sign
s
usign
N
?
?
? )( ??
?
??
? ?
?
???
? ))1(1()1()1( *2
* q
A
Aq
A
s
s ??
??
?
? , where 0* ?s? ,
01 ?? q
A
, 0?sA  (see (26)) and .0
)1(1 * ???? q?
?
? According to (31) two offsetting
mechanisms are important when evaluating the overall effects of intensified product
market competition on equilibrium unemployment. On the one hand, stronger product
market competition will decrease the optimal profit share and thereby reduce
unemployment (the term )0)1()1( * ??? q
As
?
?
? . But on the other hand, stronger product
market competition will also increase the mark-up in the labor market, which will raise
10 The unemployment rate satisfies 10 ?? Nu if and only if
A
q 1? , which we assume  to
hold throughout the analysis.
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equilibrium unemployment (the term ).0))1(1( *2 ??
?? q
A
As ?
?
?  We summarize these
observations in
Proposition 6 Equilibrium unemployment is an increasing function of the relative
bargaining power of the trade union. Intensified product market competition will have
an ambiguous effect on equilibrium unemployment due to the negative effect on profit
sharing and the positive effect on the wage mark-up.
From (31) we can deduce a number of interesting special cases. If all the
bargaining power lies with the union ( 1?? ), it holds that 0?sA  by (26), whereas the
optimal profit share is decreased 0?s? . On the other hand, if the union does not have
any bargaining power ( 0?? ), then according to (26) 0?sA  and it also holds that
.0?s?  This can be summarized in
Corollary 2 When the firms commit to optimal profit sharing, then intensified product
market competition (i) decreases equilibrium unemployment in the case of a monopoly
trade union, but (ii) it has no effect on equilibrium unemployment when the trade union
has no bargaining power.
In the absence of profit sharing the equilibrium unemployment (29) can be
expressed as
q
Au N
?
?
?
? 1
ˆ
11
0?
, where the mark-up ? ?? ??????
?????
)1()1)(1(
)1()1(ˆ
????
????A
depends only on the relative bargaining power of the trade union and the wage
elasticity of labor demand. In this case we have the following relationship between
equilibrium unemployment and the intensity of product market competition
0ˆ
ˆ
)1( 2
1
0
???
?
? ?
? A
Aq
s
u s
N
?
, where ? ? 0)1()1)(1(
)1(ˆ
2
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?
????
???
?????
??? s
sA  .             (32)
Thus we have
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Corollary 3 In the absence of profit sharing intensified competition in the product
market will decrease equilibrium unemployment as it decreases the wage mark-up.
According to Proposition 6 intensified product market competition will, in
general, have an ambiguous effect on equilibrium unemployment in the presence of
committed profit sharing when the trade union has an intermediate relative bargaining
power ( 10 ?? ? ). From (31) we can generally conclude that the impact of intensified
product market competition on equilibrium unemployment is determined by the
interplay between labor market institutions (captured by ? ), labor market policy
(captured by the benefit-replacement ratio q ) and the production technology (captured
by the production function parameter ? ). These affect equilibrium unemployment
through the wage elasticity of labor demand, wage mark-up, and profit sharing. In order
to understand and open up this ambiguity it is important to conduct numerical
simulations in order to characterize those circumstances when intensified product
market competition will decrease (increase) equilibrium unemployment.
In Table 1 we characterize numerically how intensified product market
competition, measured by s , affects (i) the wage elasticity of labor demand )(? , (ii) the
firm’s optimal profit share )(? , (iii) the wage mark-up )(A  and (iv) equilibrium
unemployment )( Nu  for a given configuration of parameter values of the concavity of
production function )(? , the relative bargaining power of the trade union )(?  and the
benefit-replacement ratio )(q .
Fixed parameter values are ? = 0.8, ? = 0.3 and q = 0.4.
s ? ? A uN
2 1.667 0.200 1.031 0.124
4 2.500 0.150 1.044 0.125
8 3.333 0.100 1.056 0.124
16 4.000 0.060 1.064 0.122
32 4.444 0.033 1.069 0.120
64 4.706 0.018 1.072 0.118
128 4.848 0.009 1.073 0.117
256 4.923 0.005 1.074 0.117
512 4.961 0.002 1.075 0.117
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Table 1:   The wage elasticity, optimal profit share, wage mark-up and
equilibrium unemployment as a function of the intensity of product
market competition.
The simulations reported in Table 1 verifies that the wage elasticity of labor
demand, the profit share and the wage mark-up are all strictly monotonic as a function
of the intensity of product market competition as theoretically predicted by (12), (24)
and (26). Furthermore, the simulated values all tend to be fairly realistic from an
empirical point of view.11 But interestingly, the equilibrium unemployment is not fully
monotonic as a function of the intensity of product market competition. For a restricted
segment with sufficiently strong product market imperfections the equilibrium
unemployment is increasing as a function of the intensity of competition. However,
under sufficiently weak product market imperfections increased competition will
monotonically decrease unemployment.12
11  For example, the wage mark-up seems to be broadly in line with the empirical estimates presented
by Blanchflower and Bryson (2002).
12  The simulations displayed in Figure 3 also illustrate that reduced labor market imperfections
(characterized by lower bargaining power of the trade union) might have a more significant impact
on equilibrium unemployment than intensified product market competition. However, it is outside
the scope to this paper to systematically investigate how important intensified product market
competition is relative to labor market imperfections as an explanation of equilibrium
unemployment.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium unemployment as a function of the intensity of product
market competition under different levels of the relative bargaining
power of the trade union (? ),  when 7,0??  and .4,0?q
Figure 3 illustrates the significance of the labor market imperfection ( ? ) for the
relationship between the intensity of product market competition and equilibrium
unemployment. The qualitative nature of this relationship is robust across different
levels of the trade union’s bargaining power, but naturally a higher relative bargaining
power of the trade union generates a significant shift towards higher levels of
equilibrium unemployment.
In light of Figure 3 we can ask: Under which combinations ),( ?s  does it hold
true that the equilibrium unemployment depends monotonically on the intensity of
product market competition? With sufficiently relaxed product market competition,
intensified competition (higher s ) will increase the wage mark-up and decrease profit
sharing with the former effect being stronger. However, the relative strength of these
opposite effects will change with intensified product market competition. Figure 4
exhibits the location of those ),( ?s -combinations under which equilibrium
23
unemployment is independent of the degree of product market competition when the
parameter of the production function is 7,0??  and the benefit-replacement ratio is
4,0?q . For combinations below and to the left of this curve intensified product market
competition will actually harm employment. As we can observe from Figure 4, this
may happen for sufficiently strong product market imperfections, i.e. for sufficiently
low values of s . Furthermore, higher relative bargaining power of the trade union shifts
this threshold towards stronger product market imperfections. Conversely, the required
value of s  above which intensified product market competition promotes employment
is decreasing as a function of ? . In this respect labor market and product market
imperfections are complementary channels in the creation of circumstances under
which intensified product market competition harms employment.
Figure 4: Characterization of ),( ?s -combinations under which the equilibrium
unemployment is independent of the intensity of product market
competition when 7,0??  and 4,0?q .
In Figure 5 we illustrate how the concavity of the production function
impacts significantly on the region under which intensified product market competition
hurts employment. Namely, by increasing the parameter to 9,0??  so that the
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production function is less concave we observe that the region under which intensified
product market competition hurts employment is significantly expanded. In particular,
the location of the curve describing the ),( ?s -combinations under which the
equilibrium unemployment is independent of the intensity of product market
competition is significantly shifted to the right.
Figure 5: Characterization of ),( ?s -combinations under which the equilibrium
unemployment is independent of the intensity of product market
competition when 9,0??  and 4,0?q .
In fact, as the production function approaches linearity the parameter
combinations such that intensified product market competition hurts employment is
expanded to capture a significant segment of the feasible ),( ?s -combinations. This
feature is verified in Figure 6.
How can we intuitively explain why the parameter ?  is important for the
relationship between the intensity of product market competition and equilibrium
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unemployment? Within the general equilibrium framework the relevant outside option
for the individual is given by (28), which can be rewritten as follows
??
?
??
? ?
?
?? quuwN )11()1( *?
?
? .
This shows that the intensity of product market competition impacts on the outside
option through two offsetting effects: (i) it moderates the equilibrium profit share, but
(ii) it also increases the negotiated base wage. Formally, the impact of the intensity of
product market competition on this outside option is determined by
?
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?
?
?
?
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?
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?
?
?
?
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?
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ww
ss
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 ,
from which we can see that the positive effect 0?
?
?
s
wN  always dominates when ?  is
sufficiently close to 1.13
Figure 6: Characterization of ),( ?s -combinations under which the equilibrium
unemployment is independent of the intensity of product market
competition when 99,0??  and 4,0?q .
13  In practice a configuration with ?  close to one could capture a situation where the utilization of
capital would be very low. This might lead to a production function not far from linear with
respect to labor and thereby increasing the wage elasticity of labor demand.
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Finally, from the argument above we can also infer that a higher benefit-
replacement ratio q tends to make it more likely that intensified product market
competition would hurt employment. This feature is illustrated in Appendix D by
Figures 7 and 8, which graphically explores the effects of intensified competition on
equilibrium unemployment for an increase in the replacement ratio q.
VII.  Concluding Comments
We have developed a framework with product and labor market imperfections
and their interactions to study the effects of intensified product market competition on
the optimal profit sharing, on the associated negotiated base wage and, importantly, on
the equilibrium unemployment. The time sequence of decisions has been postulated as
follows: First, in the long run firms have been assumed to commit themselves to profit
sharing in anticipation of the negotiated base wage as well as price setting in the
product markets and labor demand. Second, contingent on the profit sharing decision,
firms and labor unions have been postulated to bargain about the base wage by using
the ‘right-to-manage’ approach, anticipating its impacts on labor demand and price
setting in the product markets. Finally, firms have been assumed to make employment
and price setting decisions taking both the optimal profit sharing and the negotiated
base wage as given.
We have obtained several new results. The optimal profit share, which the firms
use as a wage-moderating commitment device, is smaller than the bargaining power of
the trade union unlike in the current literature and more consistent with empirics.
Intensified product market competition decreases the optimal profit shares. This holds
true, because the wage-increasing effect of the reduced optimal profit share dominates
relative to the wage-reducing effect associated with a higher wage elasticity of labor
demand. Finally, and importantly, intensified product market competition does not
necessarily reduce equilibrium unemployment. Intensified product market competition
will have a direct negative effect on equilibrium unemployment as it induces a lower
optimal profit share and an indirect positive effect on unemployment as it increases the
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wage mark-up. Hence a reduced distortion in the product market may not improve the
performance of the labor market, which suffers from a primary distortion with its roots
in the bargaining power of the trade union.14
In particular, intensified product market competition will hurt employment if the
product market imperfection is “sufficiently strong” and the relative bargaining power
of the trade union is not “high enough”. But when firms commit to optimal profit
sharing, intensified product market competition will decrease equilibrium
unemployment in the case of monopoly trade union, while it has no effect on
equilibrium unemployment when the trade union has no bargaining power. Finally, in
the absence of profit sharing, intensified competition in the product market will always
decrease the equilibrium unemployment by decreasing the wage mark-up in the labor
market. Thus, profit sharing constitutes an essential feature of the mechanism according
to which intensified product market competition may actually harm employment. In
this respect our analysis emphasizes the importance of policies directed at reducing
labor market imperfections under those circumstances where profit sharing is applied
across the economy.
Koskela and Stenbacka (2004b) have investigated the interaction between credit
and labor market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment in the presence of profit
sharing. They demonstrated that intensified credit market competition increases
equilibrium unemployment if the labor market ‘rigidities’, characterized by high
relative bargaining power of unions and high benefit-replacement ratios, are sufficiently
strong and vice versa if ‘rigidities’ are sufficiently weak (see also Koskela and
Stenbacka (2004a)). Wasmer and Weil (2004) have investigated a related issue in a
different framework with job search, labor and credit matching frictions and negotiated
mark-ups in the labor and credit markets. It would be an important and challenging new
topic for further research to analyze the interaction between product, labor and credit
market imperfections and their impacts on equilibrium unemployment within the
framework of an integrated model.
Within our framework with monopolistic competition the degree of competition
has been measured by the elasticity of substitution between products. It would be an
14 This argument is analogous to the classical second best analysis by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-
57), according to which it is not necessarily desirable from a welfare point of view to decrease
distortions in one particular market if several markets face distortions.
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analytical challenge for future research to capture the product market imperfections by
an oligopoly model. Under such circumstances the returns from the use of profit
sharing might depend on whether the product market decisions are strategic substitutes
or complements (for example, quantities or prices). Within such a framework the
relationship the effects of product market competition on equilibrium unemployment
might also depend on the strategic nature of the competition.
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APPENDIX A: The Wage Elasticity of Labor Demand
In order to simplify notation we now abstract from the firm-specific index i  and define
the wage elasticity of labor demand
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Using (A2) we have
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By imposing the symmetry condition Pp ?  we get the wage elasticity of labor demand
expression presented in (11). QED.
APPENDIX B: The Indirect Profit Function
Substituting the labor demand (10) into the profit function yields
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By further substituting in the optimal price-setting (7) we find that the indirect profit
function is given by
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                QED.
APPENDIX C: The Negotiated Base Wage
This appendix develops the expressions for the terms *
*
?
? w  and
U
Uw  in the first-order
condition (16) determining the Nash bargaining solution. We start by looking at the
profit response by the firm to a change in the wage rate. The indirect profit function
was derived in Appendix B. By applying the envelope theorem, according to which the
effect which take place through the labor demand vanish at the optimum, we find that
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As for the trade union side we find that ? ?bw
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. Thus, it follows
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and observing the fact ??? /)1(*
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Substituting (C1) and C2) into (16) and solving the resulting equation with respect to w
yields (17). QED.
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APPENDIX D: The Effects of the Benefit-Replacement Ratio on the Relationship
between the Intensity of Product Market Competition and Equilibrium
Unemployment
Figure 7: Characterization of ),( ?s -combinations under which the
equilibrium unemployment is independent of the intensity of
product market competition when the benefit-replacement
ratio is 3.0?q and 9,0?? .
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Figure 8: Characterization of ),( ?s -combinations under which the
equilibrium unemployment is independent of the intensity of
product market competition when the benefit-replacement
ratio is 5.0?q  and 9,0?? .
